





For the most part the 2003 Criminal Justice Act, which came into effect in 
England and Wales in April 2005, was accepted by the probation service with 
relatively little opposition. Given the enormity of its impact acquiescence to this 
degree of change ought to come as something of a surprise. The 2003 Act 
changed fundamentally the nature of community supervision, it brought to an end 
the traditional range of non-custodial penalties and replaced them with a single 
community order to which sentencers could add any of 12 possible requirements. 
This paper considers the impact of the 2003 legislation on one particular offender 
group – drug misusers. Drug misusing offenders have the potential to pose 
serious difficulties for probation officers; the habitual nature of drug addiction and 
a tendency toward an irregular lifestyle make drug misusers particularly 
susceptible to breach. Under the new legislation courts have significantly fewer 
options available to them when responding to incidents of offender non-
compliance. This paper argues that many of the provisions of the 2003 Act 
together with developments elsewhere in the UK are likely to have impacted 
disproportionately on those groups whose lifestyles are chaotic and whose 
routines are incompatible with the terms and conditions of modern day probation 
practice. It concludes that greater flexibility towards non-compliance, supported 
by regular and consistent judicial review, would encourage improved rates of 





So far as the probation service is concerned, the introduction of the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act appears, generally speaking, to have been a relatively quiet and 
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trouble free affair (but see Marston (2010) and National Audit Office (2008) for a 
discussion of impact on workloads in particular). For anyone involved in the 
administration of criminal justice, and certainly for anyone who remembers the 
introduction of the 1991 CJA, this ought to come as a surprise given the enormity 
of its impact. Whilst there was at least a modicum of disquiet when the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000 changed the titles of well-known sentences, 
the 2003 Act effectively brought an end to many of the traditions associated with 
community based sentencing. More specifically, and with respect to community 
penalties, the 2003 Act replaced the traditional range of individual community 
orders with one single order to which sentencers may attach any of 12 possible 
requirements.  
 
There is much to say about the introduction of this Act and arguably even more to 
say about the scarcity of academic comment that has accompanied this 
transformation in probation practice (for exceptions see Von Hirsch and Roberts 
2004, Player 2005, Fowles 2006). This article however, focuses on just one 
aspect of the 2003 legislation, namely the community supervision of drug 
misusing offenders. Drug misusers present the probation service with a number 
of challenges; conventional wisdom suggests that the inevitable escalation in the 
level of their criminality, combined with their propensity toward a chaotic lifestyle 
and an inclination toward relapse make them especially vulnerable to falling foul 
of the terms and conditions of supervision (Turnbull et al. 2000). 
 
In previous incarnations criminal justice legislation has provided the courts with 
the opportunity to issue offenders in breach of a community order with a fine or 
take no action thus allowing the order to continue in its original form. In effect, 
courts had the option to respond to recalcitrant offenders in a measured and 
moderate way and this was particularly the case where offenders seized the 
opportunity to re-discover a commitment to their order in the period between 
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notification of breach and court action. The 2003 Act significantly curtails the 
courts‟ power in relation to breach action; courts must now either re-sentence or 
add additional requirements to an order. Although these provisions apply across 
the spectrum of offenders, this paper suggests that drug misusers, because of the 
precarious nature of recovery, are likely to be disproportionately affected by this 
particular aspect of the Act. 
 
 
Drug misusers in the criminal justice system 
 
Whilst in reality the probation service has been working with drug users since at 
least the mid 1960s (see Dawtry 1968) it is only during the past few decades that 
this issue has attracted any significant degree of attention. It was the arrival of 
HIV during the 1980‟s, and more particularly its association with intravenous drug 
users, that pushed the issue of drug using offenders into prominence and 
ultimately created the impetus for a new model of practice. Driven by the fear 
that HIV had the potential to be transmitted to the general population, all 
agencies engaging with potentially „risky‟ groups were strongly advised to 
implement a harm reduction strategy, and the probation service was certainly no 
exception (Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs 1982, 1988, 1991). The 
criminal justice system, along with other relevant agencies, was told, in no 
uncertain terms, that “…HIV is a greater threat to public and individual health 
than drug misuse. The first goal of work with drug misusers therefore must be to 
prevent them from acquiring or transmitting the virus.” (ACMD 1988 p. 1) 
 
Whilst a range of agencies, probation included, braced themselves for the rapid 
and unimpeded spread of HIV amongst their respective drug using clients, the 
success of the harm reduction model demonstrated its worth and most now agree 
that the approach effectively and significantly curtailed the spread of the disease 
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(Strang 2005; McDermott 2005). The success of harm minimisation, however, 
has been no guarantee of its continuance as the dominant mode of engagement 
with drug users. During the course of the last decade or so concern over the 
extent to which drug misuse drives criminality has seen coercive and punitive 
measures rise in their popularity (Duke 2006). Even if these have not replaced 
health concerns completely, there is now sufficient concern amongst academic 
and practice communities to suggest that harm reduction might have been 
relegated to a position of secondary importance (Buchanan and Young 2000, 
Seddon 2009) with the emphasis shifted from benefit for the individual to benefit 
for the community (Barton, 1999) and, consistent with the „punitive turn‟ directed 
at offenders more generally (Pratt et al., 2005) in the context of the „culture of 
control‟ associated with late modern penality (Garland, 2001), greater priority 
accorded to compliance and enforcement (Hunt and Stevens 2004). 
 
As concerns over the threat of HIV gradually subsided, the Government went to 
considerable lengths to publicise the link between illicit drug use and acquisitive 
criminality (HM Government 1995, 1998). The eventual consequence of this 
mounting concern was to bring about an alteration in the perceived purpose of 
treatment. Certainly as it applied to the criminal justice system, drug treatment 
was regarded as beneficial not just because it brought with it a range of individual 
and public health benefits, though these were not entirely dismissed, but because 
effective treatment could lead to abstinence from drugs and this in turn was 
expected to deliver a cessation (or at least significant reduction) in criminal 
activity (Buchanan and Young 2000; Harman and Paylor 2002; see also Carlin 
2011 and Stevens 2011 for a contemporary discussion of the tension between 
public health and criminal justice goals in treatment). Finch and Ashton (2005) 
have suggested that nowhere was this emphasis on abstinence as the anticipated 
goal of treatment more evident than in the Drug Treatment and Testing Order 
(DTTO), though arguably the objective of the DTTO was less about promoting 
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abstinence per se than about severing the purported link between drug use and 
acquisitive crime. Introduced as part of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, this 
community-based order was expected “…to toughen up the probation response to 
drug abuse and require the offender to undergo treatment.” (Bean 2002, p.74) 
 
In essence the DTTO was based on the assumption “…that drug use is linked to 
crime, that coercive treatment enforced through the criminal justice system is at 
least as effective as non-coerced treatment and that there is good evidence from 
the UK that treatment does indeed reduce drug use” (Finch and Ashton 2005, 
p.189). While academics have sought to highlight the complex nature of the link 
between drugs and crime and the inconclusive evidence upon which relational 
claims are based (Stevens et al., 2005), findings from the National Treatment 
Outcome Research Study (NTORS) had demonstrated that appropriate treatment 
could not only reduce drug use, but where this happened criminal activity was 
also significantly curtailed (Gossop et al. 1998, Gossop et al. 2000; Polkinghorne 
et al. 2004). Subsequently, similar conclusions regarding the potential 
effectiveness of drug treatment have been reached by the Drug Outcome 
Research in Scotland (DORIS) study (McIntosh et al., 2007) and by other 
narrative (McSweeney et al., 2008) and meta-analytic (Lösel et al., 2011) 
reviews.  
 
Given the frequent link between their offending and drug use, DTTOs were 
thought by policy makers to hold particular promise for female offenders, whom 
subsequent research has shown to have more entrenched levels of drug use and 
who might benefit from careful targeting of criminal justice interventions 
(Holloway and Bennett, 2007; UK Drug Policy Commission, 2008)i. However, as 
Barton (1999) has argued, the focus of the DTTO and that of drug policies more 
generally on high tariff, acquisitive crime meant that women, who were funding 
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their drug habits through prostitution and fraud were “becoming even more 
marginalised and forced onto waiting lists” (p.475). 
 
As an idea, the DTTO had much to commend it: intellectually it came from „good 
stock‟ and politically it appeared to offer an antidote to the probation service‟s 
traditional association with social work values (see Sparrow et al. 2002). Initial 
evaluations of DTTOs however, gave every indication that there was a 
considerable gulf between policy intention and practice reality. The original pilot 
schemes in Croydon, Liverpool and Gloucestershire showed significant variations 
in the standard of supervision offered and all three probation areas struggled to 
form workable partnerships between themselves and the all-important drug 
service providers, with DTTO provision influenced to a significant extent by local 
treatment availability and complex commissioning arrangements within probation 
areas to ensure the availability of adequate treatment options. Despite the 
existence, and in some cases the persistence, of these issues, the DTTO did 
nonetheless demonstrate its capacity to bring about a reduction in the drug use of 
its participants (See Turnbull et al. 2000) and associated reductions in recidivism 
(Hough et al. 2003). Similar conclusions were reached from the evaluation of the 
DTTO pilots in Scotland (Eley et al. 2002, McIvor 2004) where, interestingly, 
implementation difficulties appeared less pronounced and outcomes consequently 
improved (Ashton 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding the early onset of some very serious implementation problems, 
in October 2000, and in advance of the results from the evaluation studies, the 
Government chose to roll out the DTTO programme nationally. As Bean (2002 p. 
79) has quite rightly pointed out, this suggests “…that a political decision had 
been reached rather than a criminological one.” Whilst there was no national 
evaluation of the DTTO (either in England and Wales or in Scotland where the 
decision to proceed to national roll-out also predated the completion of an 
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evaluation of the pilot schemes), the indications are that Services around the 
country continued to experience, to greater or lesser degrees, the same problems 
that were identified in the original evaluation studies (Turner 2004, Faulk 2004). 
Despite the persistence of these difficulties, however, most would agree that the 
probation service went to considerable lengths to make the DTTO a workable and 




Drug misusers and the 2003 Criminal Justice Act 
 
Legislative change is now a common and established feature of the criminal 
justice system (Fowles 2006). To such ends, the probation service‟s spirited 
attempts to make a success out of an order whose legacy owed at least as much 
to political posturing as it did to strategic foresight was never likely to guarantee 
protection from future policy upheaval. As Services around the country continued 
with their attempts to resolve the complexities associated with partnerships 
between health and criminal justice agencies (see Rumgay 2000) the Government 
announced its routine „shake-up‟ in the probation service and with it the demise 
of the DTTO. 
 
The antecedent history of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act is to be found in both the 
Auld and Halliday reports (Home Office 2001), and then subsequently in the 
Government‟s White Paper „Justice for All‟ (Home Office 2002). The scope of the 
2003 legislation was so wide as to make detailed consideration of its impact 
beyond the scope of this particular paper. For our purposes however, the most 
crucial point to make about this legislation is that it effectively ended community 
supervision as most of us knew it. The traditional probation order and community 
service order (community rehabilitation and community punishment orders) were 
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replaced by a single generic community sentence to which sentencers could 
attach one or more of 12 possible requirements. These included, „supervision‟ - 
akin to the old probation order - „unpaid work‟ - what we used to know as 
community service - requirements to attend „accredited programmes‟ and, of 
most relevance to this discussion, a „drug rehabilitation requirement‟ (DRR). 
 
There are noticeable similarities between the old DTTO and the DRR which 
replaced it. DRRs can last for between 6 and 36 months and they are designed for 
offenders who are dependent on, or who have a propensity to misuse, drugs and 
where it is judged that their drug misuse is susceptible to treatment. Above all 
the DRR contains the two defining characteristics of its predecessor, namely the 
right to test for the presence of drugs and the right for courts to review the 
progress of the offender. Beyond these similarities however, there are a number 
of potentially important differences. Firstly, it was not at all clear what level of 
supervision would be expected within the new DRR. Advice to Services suggested 
that at low levels of seriousness the DRR alone should be sufficient to tackle an 
offender‟s difficulties. For more serious offenders, however, the suggestion was 
that the DRR should be combined with an additional supervision requirement to 
aid rehabilitation. Secondly, the old DTTO was, broadly speaking, reserved for 
class A drug users at immediate risk of a custodial sentence; by contrast the 
newly devised DRR was deemed to be appropriate for a wider range of drug 
usersii, potentially resulting in increased access to court-ordered treatment for 
persistent, low level offenders (Hollingworth 2008) but with the clear potential to 
swell case loads, to net-widen and to bring low level users into contact with those 
at the heavier end of abuse. Finally, offenders who were in breach of their orders 
were no longer eligible for a financial penalty. The implications of increasing the 
punitive consequences of failure for this particular group of offenders is significant 




Enforcement and the consequences for drug misusing offenders 
 
The issue of enforcement has featured large in all recent criminal justice 
legislation and most would now agree that the general trend has been to move 
toward ever more stringent conditions of supervision (Hedderman and Hough 
2004). Historically the probation service has always grappled with the problem of 
enforcement and despite claims of a professional antipathy toward the issue of 
breach, the truth is that probation officers have always been willing to return 
non-compliant offenders to court, albeit with varying degrees of reluctance 
(Sparrow and Webb 2004). What characterises more recent legislation, however, 
is the Home Office‟s unrelenting assault on the autonomy of probation officers 
and, perhaps more crucially, their attempts to constrain the powers of the court. 
In essence this has meant that probation officers have less opportunity not to 
breach and the courts have significantly curtailed options in terms of their 
response to non-compliance. 
 
Most recent histories of the probation service now identify the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act as the formal divide between „old‟ and „new‟ style probation practice, 
with probation thereafter being recast as „punishment in the community‟ and the 
introduction of National Standards in 1992 marking the beginning of a new 
relationship between the Home Office and the probation service (Raynor and 
Vanstone 2007, Sparrow et al. 2002). Subsequent revisions of National Standards 
(Home Office 1995, 2000, 2005; Ministry of Justice 2007) and repeated attempts 
to „firm up‟ the probation service through legislative action have resulted in a 
gradual erosion of practitioner autonomy and a noticeable rise in the importance 
of enforcement (Mair and Canton 2007). The 2003 Criminal Justice Act signified 
the clearest message yet that failure on the part of offenders to comply with the 
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terms and conditions of their order will be met with a speedy and punitive 
response. 
 
Breach of the community order is dealt with under section 8 of the 2003 Act. 
Under this section the Act is clear that breach action must be brought at the 
second instance of non-compliance; “…if the responsible officer is of the opinion 
that the offender has failed without reasonable excuse to comply with any of the 
requirements of a community order, the officer must give a warning…informing 
the offender that if within the next twelve months he again fails to comply with 
any requirement of the order, he will be brought back before the court” (Taylor et 
al. 2004, p 225). Whilst the number of absences is not out of kilter with recent 
thinking in the Home Office, it is the response to breach that represents such a 
noticeable increase in the punitive consequences of non-compliance. Where a 
breach is proven, the courts‟ powers are now restricted to three possible options: 
to revoke the order and re-sentence having regard to any progress made during 
the course of supervision; to impose a period of imprisonment on the offender, 
even where the original offence was not imprisonable; or to add additional 
requirements to the existing order, thus making the remaining period of 
supervision more onerous and increasingly burdensome. Under the terms and 
conditions of the Act, courts are no longer permitted, as they were with previous 
community based orders including DTTOs, to issue a fine and allow the order to 
continue. 
 
Collectively all of these options pose serious problems. Clearly the first two bring 
with them either the distinct possibility or, alternatively, the absolute certainty of 
imprisonment. At first sight, therefore, the addition of extra requirements does at 
least appear to offer the promise of a measured approach to non-compliance. 
Assuming, however, that the original sentence was based on an assessment that 
considered both the seriousness of the offence, and also type and range of 
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offending, it will presumably reflect a delicate balance of deterrence and 
incapacitation on the one hand, and reform and rehabilitation on the other. Part 
of this process will inevitably have involved thinking about what offenders are 
capable of managing, and whilst not „overloading‟ offenders might appear to hark 
back to the days when probation was indistinguishable from social work, this does 
not stop such an approach having considerable merit. The practice of adding 
further requirements to orders where offenders have already shown their 
reluctance, or perhaps their inability, to comply might, therefore, defy rational 
notions of good practice. However, in the absence of relevant published data it is 
impossible to ascertain the extent to which this is occurring or to identify the 
numbers of offenders who are imprisoned specifically for breaching a DRR (see 
Hansard, 2010). 
 
Breach rates for DTTOs were typically high: for example Hough et al. (2003) found 
that 67 per cent of orders were revoked due to non-compliance or reconviction. 
Assessing the enforcement of DRRs specifically is problematic, since there are no 
published data on rates of breach or imprisonment following breach of the specific 
requirements of a community order or suspended sentence order. However, data 
provided in a written parliamentary answer by David Hanson (then Minister of 
State for Justice) on 9 March 2009 indicated that there had been an increase in 
the revocation rate for failure to comply with a DTTO/DRR (as a result of 
breaches of requirements or reconviction for a further offence) from 23% in 
2005/6 to 29% in 2007/8. Whilst this may seem at odds with the reported 
increase in completion rates of DTTOs/DRRs from 28% in 2003 to 47% in 2008/9 
in the same parliamentary answer, the latter may reflect a shift towards the use 
of shorter DRRs – which are less likely to be breached (Gyateng et al., 2010) - 
with less entrenched drug users/offenders. Given evidence that community orders 
more generally are replacing other non-custodial options rather than sentences of 
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imprisonment, the net effect may be an overall increase in the numbers of offenders 





Whilst the ultimate justification for, and defence of,  the DTTO and DRR has been 
that coercion is effective (Hough 1996, McSweeney et al. 2007 but see Stevens, 
Berto et al. 2005), there is little evidence to suggest that meeting failure with an 
overtly punitive response is likely to re-engage the offender with the process of 
supervision (Ugwudike  2010). There is, however, evidence that achieving 
increased compliance with supervision and treatment can reap longer term 
benefits in terms of sustained reductions in drug use and recidivism, with those 
retained in treatment doing significantly better that those whose orders are 
revoked (Hough et al. 2003, McIvor 2004).  Hearnden and Millie (2004) found 
that offenders on community based orders whose orders were breached and 
continued had lower reconviction rates than those whose orders were revoked, 
arguing that the most effective strategies for achieving increased compliance 
were likely to focus on rewarding progress rather than punishing non-compliance. 
As McSweeney et al. (2008. P. 48) observe, “in order to effect behavioural 
change, the research evidence appears to encourage a move away from 
punishment-oriented to incentive based approaches”. 
 
Robinson and McNeill (2008 p. 444) have argued that “...an inflexible response to 
formal non-compliance has the potential to jeopardise future substantive 
compliance...” by undermining legitimate authority, while Hucklesby (2009) has 
argued that compliance among offenders on electronically monitored curfew 
orders is influenced by experiences of procedural justice and legitimacy (Tyler, 
1990). McIvor (2009, 2010a) has advanced similar arguments in relation to drug 
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court participants, suggesting that increased legitimacy in turn promotes 
normative as opposed to constraint-based or instrumental compliance (Bottoms, 
2001). Given that Powell et al. (2007) found that being breached following a third 
missed appointment was perceived as overly harsh by offenders subject to 
DTTOs, one must wonder what impact current enforcement and breach practices 
must have upon offenders‟ perceptions of judicial legitimacy and procedural 
justice. Indeed, the need for flexibility of response by treatment providers to non-
compliance has been further highlighted by Ashby et al. (2011) in relation to the 
Alcohol Treatment Requirement whereby, in the event of „relapse‟, 
“encouragement rather than punishment is offered, enabling individuals to re-
assess their situation” (p.55). 
 
Judicial monitoring of progress 
 
Several commentators have suggested that court-based reviews of community 
orders generally and the review of drug treatment requirements more particularly 
could help to achieve improved retention (e.g. McSweeney et al. 2008, McIvor, 
2009, 2010b).  Certainly the antecedent history of court-based review can be 
found in the US drug courts (with, for example, Bean (2002) describing DTTOs as 
„watered down‟ versions of drug courts). The US Drug Court movement 
established an operational procedure of judicial monitoring – rooted in a 
framework of therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler and Winick 1992) - that would 
appear not to sit easily alongside the British tradition of adversarial justice.  For 
drug courts – and, indeed, other types of „problem-solving‟ courts that are now 
emerging in the UK (see McIvor 2010a, 2010b) - the focus is on achieving 
treatment outcomes and in delivering a very distinctive form of individualised 
justice, with the court reserving the right to both review and amend the 
treatment regime during the period of supervision. Whilst the right of the court to 
respond to the peculiarities of an individual case – through the use of 
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appropriately tailored sanctions and rewards that can penalise non-compliance 
and recognise progress in meaningful ways - has come to define problem-solving 
court process, recent legislation in England and Wales has meant that, in terms of 
responding to non-compliance and breach, judicial flexibility with drug users has 
become an even more remote possibility. 
 
McIvor (2010b, pp. 222-3) has argued that “(a)dvocates for increased judicial 
involvement in offender management have pointed to its potential to provide 
„better‟ justice by improving judicial decision-making, promoting procedural 
justice, enhancing compliance and achieving improved outcomes”. Offenders 
appear generally to find court-based reviews motivating (Powell et al. 2007, 
Turnbull and Webster 2007, McIvor, 2009) and there is evidence from domestic 
violence courts that ongoing reviews reduce non-compliance and re-arrests 
(Burton 2006). In the USA, Senjo and Leip (2000) found that supportive 
comments offered by sentencers during review hearings had a significant effect 
on drug court programme completion and, consistent with Maruna and LeBel‟s 
(2003) assertion that strengths-based approaches are more effective than 
coerced obedience in engaging offenders and promoting intrinsic motivation to 
change, that offenders were particularly responsive to the use of positive 
reinforcement as opposed to the more traditional use of punishment. 
 
There is emerging evidence from research into problem-solving courts that 
consistency or continuity of sentencers is linked to individual success. The process 
evaluation of the Dedicated Drug Courts in England found that continuity of 
sentencer across court appearances was associated with enhanced compliance 
with court hearings, lower levels of positive drug tests for heroin, an increased 
rate of completion and a reduced frequency of reconviction (Matrix Knowledge 
Group 2008)iii.  In the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre offenders 
reacted positively to reviews and “increased engagement with the proceedings 
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and the continuity provided by the single judge model ... served to increase 
offenders‟ accountability to the court” (McKenna 2007, p. 32). Offenders who 
were subject to review requirements reported fewer issues in completing their 
sentence and there was some evidence that their completion rates were higher 
than those of comparison cases dealt with in another court (McKenna 2007).  
 
There is little doubt that a court can exercise a powerful influence over an 
offender‟s commitment to treatment and there is certainly greater scope for 
courts to move away from their traditional adversarial model and make use 
instead of more constructive approaches that motivate offenders to participate in 
treatment and which offer positive reinforcement to support desired patterns of 
behaviour (McGuire 2003). Whilst research suggests that versions of the 
„therapeutic‟ or „problem-solving‟ court could be a realistic and effective prospect 
for drug users (McIvor 2010a) the extent to which the 2003 Act shifts the British 
approach to dealing with drug misusers in this direction is doubtful. Although the 
legislation allows for the periodic review of all orders with DRRs, such reviews are 
only required for DRRs over 12 months, even though offenders with shorter 
requirements are also likely to benefit from judicial monitoring (Powell et al. 
2007, McSweeney et al. 2008), especially during the first few months of the order 
when the risk of non-compliance is particularly high (Eley et al. 2002). In its 
current incarnation then, the 2003 legislation significantly restricts the flexibility 
of the court to respond to instances of non-compliance and whilst these measures 
will impact on the whole range of offenders, it does seem likely that they will 
impact disproportionately on drug users where failure is often regarded as a 
regular feature on the road to recovery.  
 
Whilst there is much evidence to suggest that ongoing review can be beneficial to 
drug using offenders, the 2003 Act also contains provision for the periodic judicial 
review of community orders (and suspended sentence orders) more generally.  
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Heralded by the Halliday Report (2001), Section 178 of the Act 2003 introduced 
the option for courts to review offenders‟ progress on community orders, though 
this power was only made available in the first instance to the first two 
community justice centres in North Liverpool and Salford before being extended 
to a second tranche of 11 community justice centres in 2007. The 2009 Green 
Paper „Engaging Communities in Criminal Justice‟ subsequently contained 
proposals to roll out problem-solving principles to all Magistrates Courts in 
England and Wales and to encourage courts to make greater uses of the Section 
178 powers to review community orders “in order to enable the judiciary to build 
relationships with offenders, acting as a source of encouragement, praise and 
reprimand as appropriate” (Criminal Justice System 2009, para 51, p. 32). 
However, achieving consistency and continuity across review hearings has 
presented practical difficulties in Magistrates Courts in England and Wales which 
operate with a rotating three-magistrate bench (Turnbull et al. 2000; Brown and 
Payne 2007, Matrix Knowledge Group 2008). The 2009 Green paper therefore 
proposed that continuity might be achieved by having at least one magistrate 
continuously involved throughout the case review process (Criminal Justice 
System 2009, para 47, p. 30).  
 
It is also worth noting that recent legislative changes have occurred in Scotland 
through the implementation of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 
2010, the key provisions of which came into effect in February 2011. The most 
significant changes include the replacement of most existing community disposals 
(though not, interestingly, the DTTO) with a single generic Community Payback 
Order to which a range of conditions may be attached. In an attempt to 
encourage the use of community based orders as an alternative to imprisonment, 
the 2010 Act also introduced a presumption against prison sentences of three 
months and less, requiring that if they do decide to impose sentences of this 
length sentencers must provide reasons as to why no other method of dealing 
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with the offender is appropriate. The Act further enables sentencers to undertake 
periodic reviews of community payback orders, taking the form of “informal 
discussions between the judge and the offender” (Scottish Government 2008, p. 
14), with formal responses of the judiciary to the new arrangements being 
broadly positive ((Scottish Parliament 2009).  
 
 
Managing failure: The plight of the drug user in contemporary criminal 
justice 
 
As greater emphasis is placed upon treatment enforced through the criminal 
justice system (albeit that criminal justice referrals still represent a minority of 
referrals to structured drug treatment services (Jones et al 2007; National 
Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse 2009)), an increasing number of drug 
addicted individuals are likely to become the subject of probation based 
supervision (Kothari et al. 2002). Where once the primary aim of intervention was 
to maintain contact and reduce harm (even within the probation service) there is 
now a clear expectation that successful intervention is that which leads to users 
becoming drug free (HM Government 2010; see also Stevens 2011). These days 
probation officers have little room for manoeuvre, and offenders have few 
opportunities to permit their deficiencies to surface. Thus, whilst the breach court 
has always been a precarious site for recalcitrant offenders, current legislation 
means that non-compliant offenders on community orders in England and Wales 
are now almost certain to receive a noticeable curtailment of their freedom.  
 
 
For many drug users, failure is an expected part of recovery. Indeed, in McIntosh 
and McKeganey‟s (2002) account of 70 recovering addicts, relapse emerges as a 
regular feature along the road to abstinence. “A common feature of the biography 
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of most drug addicts is that their careers are likely to be peppered with numerous 
attempts to escape form their addiction. Periods of abstinence can last from a few 
days to a few years but, by definition, the great majority of these end in failure.” 
(McIntosh and McKeganey 2002, p. 90). There can be little doubt that in the early 
stages of becoming drug free, addicts are particularly susceptible to relapse. The 
continued craving for drugs, often combined with a sense of loss at shifting away 
from a familiar lifestyle can leave the ex-user emotionally delicate and thus 
vulnerable to failure. Although the relapsing nature of dependency has been 
recognised at government level (see, for example, Hansard, 2010), failure to 
recognise relapse as a near certainty in the cycle of recovery, particularly within 
the context of a court enforced programme of assistance poses, potentially, a 
number of very serious problems. 
 
For many probation clients, abiding by the terms and conditions of supervision 
can test the very limits of their organisational capabilities. For the drug 
dependant probationer however, this challenge might well defy the best efforts of 
both supervisee and supervisor. The „addict lifestyle‟ can be a busy one, filled 
daily by the necessity to acquire drugs and, as a consequence, the need to raise 
funds (Burr 1987). The inevitable realignment of priorities with the gradual onset 
of dependency is a crucial factor in the supervisory relationship since, despite 
their best intentions, it is unrealistic to assume that appointments with a 
supervising officer will be amongst the probationer‟s highest priorities. As Barton 
2003, p. 107) observes: 
 
 “Once a person becomes locked into this cycle, their life begins to 
change. There is a growing preoccupation that intrudes into the 
person‟s life, skewing their priorities towards, in our case, an illicit 
drug. With this compulsion come the routines which ensure a ready 
supply, consumption of the drug becomes less dependent on external 
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cues and the person becomes less and less concerned about the 
consequences of their actions.”  
 
For the drug dependant probationer, then, breach, like arrest, might well be an 
occupational hazard, accepted by both officer and offender as a matter of routine 
during the difficult and unpredictable road to recovery. Under the terms and 
conditions of the 2003 legislation, however, the consequences of breach are now 
set to become increasingly significant, with a term of imprisonment becoming a 
much more distinct possibility, even if a custodial sentence would not have been 
warranted for the original offenceiv. In restricting the powers of the court, the 
only alternative to custody now available is the imposition of additional 
requirements - perhaps a group-work condition or a number of hours of unpaid 
work. For such an approach to have the desired impact, an offender needs to not 
only comprehend the implications of the so-called „last chance‟, but also be 
capable of mustering the organisational skills to meet these additional 
requirements. Within probation caseloads, however, there remain a significant 
minority of offenders whose lifestyles constantly defy their best efforts to honour 
their commitments and it is these offenders who are likely to be 
disproportionately affected by this legislation. This suggests the need for 
improved assessment and targeting of DRRs upon those who are both willing and 
able to comply and decreased tolerance of non-compliance as a means of 
ensuring that treatment places are allocated to those who are ready to engage 
with them. However this may also result in an overly cautious approach in which 
many drug-using offenders who might benefit from it are denied access to 
„coerced‟ treatment. Such an outcome is, arguably, all the more likely in the 
context of recent moves towards outcome based commissioning of criminal 






Despite the move toward a more punitive response to non-compliance there 
remains, even now, little evidence to suggest that tougher enforcement leads to 
either greater compliance or a lower reconviction rate (Hedderman and Hough 
2004). Despite this fact, the approach contained in the 2003 Act remains rooted 
in the now long-standing presumption that offender compliance is most effectively 
achieved through an increase in deterrence. As Von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 6) 
have pointed out, however, an increase in penalties may not necessarily produce 
the desired effect if the target audience “…do not fear the increased penalties, or 
fear them but have overriding interests (e.g. financial ones) or inclinations (e.g. a 
drug addiction) favouring offending.” Certainly in terms of drug dependency, 
therefore, the compulsive character of addiction has the clear potential to 
override the deterrent intentions of the 2003 legislation. 
 
Within a climate dominated by the idea of effectiveness, there appears to have 
been remarkably little thought given to the issue of enforcement. According to 
Ellis (2000, p6), “…current thinking on enforcement runs counter to what works 
principles in two key areas: It lacks clear theoretical underpinning and evidence 
that it is effective [and it has]…an over-reliance on tough sounding rhetoric which 
undermines the development of a more effective approach to ensuring 
compliance…” There is little in the 2003 legislation to suggest that the current 
approach to compliance or enforcement is any different: although there is an 
expectation that breach will only occur in the face of wilful or persitent failure to 
comply (Hansard, 2010), this absence of published data make it impossible to 
determine whether or not this is happening on practice.  In fact, and based on the 
foregoing analysis, it is tempting to conclude that the point of non-compliance 
has now become the principal opportunity for the criminal justice system to 
showcase its punitive credentials. Whilst such a strategy might make sense for a 
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succession of Governments that have been keen to persuade sentencers that the 
restrictions of imprisonment can be replicated in the community, the extent to 
which some probation officers have been persuaded by the idea that breach has 
the capacity to re-establish and even improve the supervisory relationship has 
not gone un-noticed (Drakeford 1993). As a number of authors have noted, 
however, this rehabilitative view of breach is often difficult to defend in the face 
of the significant penalties and the subsequent hardships placed on offenders 
(Drakeford 1993, Ellis 2000, Sparrow and Webb 2004) even if the lack of routine 
monitoring renders these hardships difficult to qualify. 
 
If the therapeutic credentials of breach have always been difficult to defend, then 
within the context of the current legislation any such assertion seems even less 
convincing. Drug users, like other groups of offenders living insecure and chaotic 
lives, require careful handling. Their commitment to the probation service is often 
precarious at best and there is now good evidence to show that in the absence of 
what they perceive to be useful and beneficial assistance, their attachment to 
supervision can be easily and sometimes permanently damaged (Farrall 2002). In 
general terms, offenders have long histories of non-compliance and not just with 
the probation service. Indeed, as Hedderman and Hough (2004, p.163) have 
observed, “…it seems especially optimistic that probation officers will succeed in 
securing compliance where all others have failed.” Assuming the accuracy of this 
view, the prospect of a more punitive response to breach ought to give serious 
cause for concern. 
 
An approach to breach which is singularly focussed on the number of absences 
and which dismisses all other potentially salient features of a case is unlikely to 
encourage compliance or be regarded as legitimate by offenders (Sparrow and 
Webb 2004). Whilst recent thinking around effective intervention has accepted 
that one size supervision is unlikely to meet the needs of all offenders, 
 21 
enforcement remains strangely fixated with the idea of a one dimensional 
approach, despite Hedderman‟s (2003 p. 190) contention that “punishing non-
compliance by substituting a custodial sentence should be reserved for those who 
have shown themselves to be unwilling to comply despite efforts made to assist 
and encourage them to do so”. Based on the current assumption that the driver 
to effective intervention with offenders is a robust assessment of risk and need, 
then surely any response to non-compliance needs to be just as firmly rooted in 
these judgements. It is the assessment of risk and an appraisal of progress, 
therefore, rather than simply the calculation of absences, which might form the 
basis of a more flexible approach to enforcement with, logically, a more 
graduated range of penalties from which to respond (Sparrow and Webb 2004) 
and greater emphasis upon the use of rewards – such as phased reductions in the 
frequency of testing, appointments and reviews - to support and reinforce 
offenders‟ progress on their orders. As Canton (2008, p. 530) argues, “patience, 
attention, explanation and negotiation all conduce to compliance and their 
persuasive force is much more enduring that threat”. This is particularly 
important given recent evidence that ongoing judicial review may be associated 
with higher levels of non-compliance with DRRs (Gayateng et al., 2010) or other 
forms of community supervision (Jolliffe and Farrington, 2009), possibly   because 
the more intensive scrutiny and surveillance of offenders increases the likelihood 
of infractions being brought to light. Indeed, as Nolan (2001) has argued, 
problem solving court practices can be conceptualised as encapsulating a new 
form of rehabilitation in which private issues are exposed to judicial exploration 
and oversight and which makes possible the expansion of judicial authority, 
resulting in “the expansion of the state‟s supervision, monitoring and control over 
offenders‟ lives because they are being “rehabilitated”” (Burns and Peyrot, 2003, 
p. 434). This highlights the need for appropriate safeguards to ensure procedural 
fairness and renders arguments for increased tolerance and empathy with respect 
to the enforcement of orders all the more persuasive.  
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The degree to which the law and order agenda has displaced health concerns in 
the field of drug dependency might lead some to regard harm minimisation as an 
outdated mode of intervention. Such a view however is fatally flawed; in the face 
of a potential HIV epidemic harm minimisation provided nothing less than an 
inspirational opportunity for clinical practice and, it should be noted, one which 
yielded a significant degree of success. The Home Office is undoubtedly right in 
its assertion that drug users present a risk to the public and in the process of 
funding their habit they doubtless do significant social harm (Holloway and 
Bennett 2004, Holloway et al. 2004, Allen 2005). This truth does not take away 
from the fact that drug users, certainly at the heavy end of abuse, also 
experience significant personal harm (Mills 2004). Unfortunately the compulsive 
nature of drug dependency renders a simplistic deterrent based approach to 
recovery almost entirely useless. By its very nature the process of becoming drug 
free has an element of failure built into it and as a consequence more than the 
distinct likelihood of breach, especially where criminal justice agency expectations 
of abstinence conflict with drug agencies‟ tolerance of maintenance, giving out 
conflicting messages regarding what is required of offenders (National Treatment 
Agency for Substance Misuse, 2006; Department of Health (England) and the 
devolved administrations, 2007). Whilst there is little evidence to suggest that 
imprisoning drug users brings about long term recovery, there are reasons to 
believe that a therapeutically inclined court, empowered with sufficient flexibility 
to respond to changing circumstances of the drug user, can contribute to 
successful behavioural change (McIvor 2010b). It seems doubtful that to date the 
2003 Criminal Justice Act has moved the British approach to the treatment of 
drug misusing offenders in this direction. In the curtailing of judicial discretion, in 
the restricting of reviews of DRRs to those given longer orders and in the failure 
of Section 178 powers of review to be extended beyond a handful of problem-
solving courts, the 2003 Act limits the therapeutic possibilities of community 
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supervision. Indeed, in its current incarnation the legislation has the potential to 
propel drug users toward custody well before the full range of alternatives has 
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i
 In practice, however, there has been evidence of higher breach rates among 
women given DTTOs (see, for example, Scottish Government, 2010). The reasons 
for non-compliance are unclear but may include responsibilities for dependent 
children, the influence of drug-using partners and the absence of specific 
treatment and other appropriate services (Malloch and McIvor, 2011).  
ii In a similar attempt to increase the range of offenders who could access court-
mandated drug-treatment, a pilot scheme (referred to as DTTO II) was 
introduced in Scotland in 2008 aimed at lower tariff offenders.  Evaluation of the 
pilot revealed that almost one half of those given orders were women (compared 
to fewer than one in five of those given „standard‟ DTTOs) (McCoard et al., 2010). 
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The levels of non-compliance and revocation of DTTO IIs have not yet been 
documented but given their higher levels of breach of „standard‟ DTTOs the 
significant over-representation of women on DTTO IIs gives some cause for 
concern.  
iii It should be noted that the dedicated drug court evaluation was not able to 
indicate what the outcomes were for offenders who were not subject to 
continuous review. 
iii Although the government has indicated that imprisonment is intended to be 
imposed only in the event of wilful and persistent failure to comply (Hansard, 
2010) the absence of published data on enforcement and compliance makes it 
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